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FOR WHOM THE WHISTLE BLOWS: THE ROLE OF
PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT IN DODD-FRANK'S REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK
MICHAEL M. KRAuss, JULIE R. LANDY, AND JEREMY R. HARRELL'
The primary stated purpose of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank")2 is to "promote the financial
stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency
in the financial system."3 In signing Dodd-Frank into law, the President
attributed the precipitating crisis to "a breakdown in our financial system."'
Congress saw flawed and inadequate regulation as the principal cause
of this breakdown. Without a regulator taking a systemic view, seemingly
disparate risks and market forces combined to cripple the economy. No one
entity could see the whole picture. According to the Senate Banking
Committee Report: "The United States' financial regulatory structure,
constructed in a piecemeal fashion over many decades, remains hopelessly
inadequate to handle the complexities of modern finance."' In assaying the
causes of the financial crisis, the Senate report identified "gaps in the
regulatory structure" that allowed risks "to flourish outside the view of
those responsible for overseeing the financial system."6
1. The authors are members of Faegre Baker Daniels LLP's Finance Litigation Team in
Minneapolis (www.faegrebd.com). Michael Krauss is a graduate of the Stanford Law School
(1996) and the University of Michigan (1993). He previously served as an Assistant United States
Attorney in the Southern District of New York and clerked for the Hon. Eric L. Clay on the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Julie Landy is a graduate of the University of
Minnesota Law School (2010) and Macalester College (2006). She clerked for the Hon. Diana E.
Murphy on the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Jeremy Harrell is a graduate
of the University of Minnesota Law School (2011) and Carleton College (1997). He previously
worked as a reporter and magazine editor covering finance, government, business, and the arts.
2. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 7, 12, 15, 22, 26, 28, 31,
and 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank].
3. Id. at 1376.
4. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at Signing of Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (July 21, 2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-signing-dodd-frank-wall-street-
reform-and-consumer-protection-act.
5. S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 40 (2010).
6. Id. at 43.
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Dodd-Frank revamped the regulatory framework that oversees the
financial system, creating new government entities and strengthening
existing ones. Dodd-Frank was remarkable not just in the breadth and depth
of its regulatory regime but also in its almost exclusive reliance on the
government to enforce its rules and requirements. What's missing from the
statute's 2319 pages: Any significant role for private parties in enforcement.
Dodd-Frank almost nowhere authorizes or requires private parties to take
the lead in deterring misconduct and enforcing action against violations.
Private rights of action against wrongdoers for their underlying financial
misconduct are nearly nonexistent. Unlike the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
("SOX"), Dodd-Frank does not rely on companies' internal compliance
programs to detect and correct misconduct.
Instead, Dodd-Frank puts enforcement power and responsibility in
hands of government agencies. Five years later, however, we see pushback
from both those agencies and the courts, effectively questioning whether it
makes sense to sideline private parties. We examine this phenomenon
through the prism of Dodd-Frank's whistleblower program within the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). Courts nationwide are
considering whether employees who report alleged infractions only
internally-and not to the SEC-enjoy Dodd-Frank's protections against
retaliation. With few exceptions, most courts have joined the SEC in saying
yes. In doing so, they overlook a key aspect of Dodd-Frank's underlying
framework: The statute vests enforcement authority with government
regulators, particularly the SEC, and not private parties. By limiting
retaliation claims to those who notify the SEC, the statute as written
encourages employees to report suspected securities violations to
government regulators-which is critical to Dodd-Frank's scheme. While
there may be good policy reasons to encourage individuals to report
internally-without ever going to the SEC-such an approach would
deviate from the over-arching scheme. Because of a recent split among the
federal Courts of Appeals, the Supreme Court is now likely to address this
issue, and wade into the ongoing debate over the roles that government,
companies, and individuals should play in realizing Dodd-Frank's ultimate
goals.
I. DODD-FRANK VESTS THE SEC WITH NEW AND EXPANDED POWERS,
WHILE LARGELY IGNORING PRIVATE LITIGANTS
Dodd-Frank's biggest regulatory innovations-including the new
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection and the new Financial Stability
Oversight Council-consumed most headlines in 2010. Dodd-Frank,
however also made a particular point of empowering the SEC. Even aside
from the whistleblower incentives and protection program detailed below,
Dodd-Frank's Title IX-also known as the Investor Protection and
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Securities Reform Act of 2010-vests the SEC with sweeping new and
expanded authority. These changes reflected Congress's determination that
"[s]erious and far reaching problems were caused by ... ineffective SEC
regulation of investment banks such as Lehman Brothers and broker dealers
such as Madoff." 7 A few examples of this include:
Funding increases. Dodd-Frank nearly doubled the SEC's budget over
four years, from $1.3 billion in 2011 to $2.25 billion in 2015.' It also
established a $100 million reserve account.'
Credit rating agencies. Dodd-Frank gave the SEC significant
responsibility to regulate credit rating agencies like Moody's and S&P,
which were blamed for handing high ratings to toxic mortgage-backed
securities.10 The SEC's new Office of Credit Ratings oversees the rating
agencies and implements the enhanced rules and regulations under Dodd-
Frank." The SEC must create and enforce rules governing credit rating
procedures and methodologies, including rules to prevent sales and
marketing considerations from affecting ratings.12 Among other things, the
SEC must conduct an annual exam of each rating agency.1 3 It may also, in
part, fine agencies for various violations and suspend or revoke their
registration with respect to a particular class of security if the SEC
determines the agency lacks the resources to produce credit ratings with
integrity.14
New litigation enforcement tools. Dodd-Frank handed the SEC new
and enhanced litigation tools to enforce the securities laws. The SEC may
now:
* Bring aiding and abetting claims under all of the federal securities
statutes and may recover with proof that the defendants "recklessly" (not
just knowingly) provided substantial assistance to another person in
violation of the securities laws;15
* Seek monetary penalties in administrative cease-and-desist
proceedings against any public company and its directors, officers, and
employees without a jury trial and discovery before an Article III judge;1 6
7. Id. at 36.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78kk (2012).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 78d(i) (2012).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 780-7(p) (2012).
11. Id.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 780-7(h) (2012).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 780-7(p) (2012).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 780-7(d) (2012).
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77o, 78t, 80a-47, 80b-9 (2012). Before Dodd-Frank, the SEC could sue for
aiding and abetting only under the Exchange Act and only for "knowing" violations. Now, it may
also bring aiding and abetting claims under the Securities Act, the Investment Advisors Act, and
the Investment Company Act and may also recover for "reckless" violations.
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-1, 78u-2, 80a-9, 80b-3 (2012).
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* Pursue securities fraud violations internationally. The SEC may
bring enforcement actions where there is either: (1) "conduct occurring
outside the United States that has a foreseeable substantial effect within the
United States"; or (2) "conduct within the United States that constitutes
significant steps in furtherance of the violation, even if the securities
transaction occurs outside the United States and involves only foreign
investors";17
* Compel production of audit work papers by accounting firms
outside the United States;" and,
* Share information with federal, state, and foreign securities and
law enforcement authorities without waiving privilege.1 9
Contrast with private litigants. Unlike the SEC, private plaintiffs were
entrusted with few significant and new tools to recover for financial
wrongdoing. In particular, Dodd-Frank amended the Exchange Act to create
a private right of action against credit rating agencies.2 0 A rating agency's
statements are subject to the same liability under Section 11 as statements
by a registered public accounting firm or securities analyst.2 1 To recover
damages, the investor must prove that the rating agency knowingly or
recklessly failed: (1) to conduct a reasonable investigation of the rated
security with respect to the factual elements relied upon by its own
methodology for evaluating credit risk; or (2) to obtain reasonable
verification of such factual elements from other sources the agency
considered competent and that were independent of the issuer and
underwriter.22
Otherwise, Dodd-Frank largely authorizes "studies" of whether private
litigants should be able to pursue causes of actions that today belong solely
to the SEC. For example, while Dodd-Frank enables the SEC to pursue
securities violations abroad, it does not extend extraterritorial enforcement
17. 15 U.S.C. § 78AA (2012). In Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank, the Supreme Court
found no "affirmative indication" in the Exchange Act that Section 10(b) applies outside the
United States. 561 U.S. 247, 265 (2010). It held: "Section 10(b) reaches the use of a manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance only in connection with the purchase or sale of a security listed
on an American stock exchange, and the purchase or sale of any other security in the United
States." Id. at 273. Dodd-Frank supplied the missing "affirmative indication" but only as to
enforcement actions brought by the SEC and Department of Justice.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 7216(b) (2012).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78x(f) (2012).
20. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-7(m), 78u-4 (2012).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(m) (2012).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (2012). Dodd-Frank also repealed Rule 436(g) under the Securities
Act, which had exempted credit ratings from being deemed as a part of the registration statement
or prospectus prepared or certified by an expert. Dodd-Frank, supra note 2, at § 939G. As a result,
the issuer must get the rating agency's consent to include a credit rating in the prospectus or
registration, and the agency may then be subject to liability as an expert under Section 11. As a
practical matter, however, the real-world impact is that rating agencies will decline such consent
to avoid potential exposure.
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to private claims.2 3 Instead, it directed the SEC's staff to study the impact of
extending the cross-border scope of private actions.2 4 The resulting study
was inconclusive.2 5 While Dodd-Frank further expands the SEC's power to
sue for aiding and abetting securities violations, private litigants still cannot
bring such claims under any statute.2 6 Dodd-Frank simply required the
Comptroller General to study the impact of allowing private aiding and
abetting claims under any statute. 27 The resulting study concluded that
"[d]ebate continues."2 8
II. THE SEC's WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM REFLECTS CONGRESS'S
DECISION TO RELY ON GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, NOT PRIVATE RIGHTS OF
ACTION
The SEC's new whistleblower program may be its best-known
expansion of authority under Dodd-Frank. It similarly reflects Congress's
decision to rely on government agencies, and not private rights of action, to
address the financial system's "breakdown."
Section 922 of Dodd-Frank amends the Exchange Act to add a new
section titled "Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections." It
establishes incentives and a structure for individuals to report securities law
violations to the SEC. The Senate Banking Committee cited the testimony
of Harry Markopolos, who in 2000, 2001, 2005, and 2007, warned the SEC
about Bernard Madoff's massive Ponzi scheme. 29 In just one example-at
the very end of his efforts-Markopolos emailed the SEC in June 2007,
attaching "some very troubling documents that show the Madoff fraud
scheme is getting even more brazen."3 0 He cautioned: "When Madoff
finally does blow up, it's going to be spectacular."3 1 The SEC's Inspector
23. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2012).
24. Dodd-Frank, supra note 2, at § 929Y.
25. SEC Staff, Study on the Cross-Border Scope of the Private Right of Action Under
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (2012), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/929y-study-cross-border-private-rights.pdf.
26. Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011) (holding
that only an entity with "ultimate authority" over allegedly false statement may be liable in Rule
lob-5 private right of action); Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S.
148 (2008) (holding that secondary actions were not primarily liable under Rulel0b-5 because
investors had not relied on their fraudulent conduct); Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994) (holding that Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5
do not create implied private cause of action for aiding and abetting).
27. Dodd-Frank, supra note 2, at § 929Z.
28. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-664, SECURITIES FRAUD LIABILITY OF
SECONDARY ACTORS (2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dl1664.pdf
29. SEC, OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS, OIG-509, INVESTIGATION OF FAILURE OF THE SEC
TO UNCOVER BERNARD MADOFF'S PONZI SCHEME 61 (2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2009/oig-509.pdf.
30. Id. at 41.
3 1. Id
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General later observed: "His email was ignored."3 2
The Inspector General investigated the SEC's failure to uncover
Madoff's Ponzi scheme and concluded that the SEC could have acted as
early as 1992.33 His report states:
[D]espite numerous credible and detailed complaints, the SEC
never properly examined or investigated Madoff's trading and
never took the necessary, but basic, steps to determine if Madoff
was operating a Ponzi scheme. Had these efforts been made with
appropriate follow-up at any time beginning in June of 1992 until
December 2008, the SEC could have uncovered the Ponzi scheme
well before Madoff confessed.3 4
A. Basic Structure of the Whistleblower Program
The whistleblower program incorporates two basic lessons from the
SEC's failure to uncover Madoff's fraud despite tips from Markopolos and
others. First, private individuals are valuable resources in detecting fraud
and should be encouraged to come forward.3 5 Second, the SEC would
benefit from a formal structure to receive, process, and investigate tips from
the private sector.3 6 Dodd-Frank therefore motivates whistleblowers to
come forward and establishes a structure for the SEC to act on those
complaints.
That said, the SEC retains control throughout. Whistleblowers exist to
help the SEC, not to act on their own or through other private means. The
Senate report explained: "The Whistleblower Program aims to motivate
those with inside knowledge to come forward and assist the Government to
identify and prosecute persons who have violated securities laws and
recover money for victims of financial fraud."3 7
To be eligible for an award, an individual must voluntarily provide to
the SEC "original information" relating to a violation of the securities
laws.3 8 The information must lead the SEC to bring an enforcement action
32. Id.
33. Id. at 41, 59-61, 389, 456.
34. Id. at 41; See also id. at 456.
35. See, e.g., id. at 411-24 (analyzing private entities' due diligence on Madoff's
operations).
36. For example, Markopolos testified: "In 2000, [SEC's Boston Bureau Chief] warned me
that relations between the New York and Boston regional offices was about as warm and friendly
as the Yankees-Red Sox rivalry and that New York does not like to receive tips from Boston."
Allan Chernoff, Sr., Madoff Whistleblower Blasts SEC, CNN, Feb. 4, 2009,
http://money.cnn.com/2009/02/04/news/newsmakers/madoff-whistleblower/.
37. S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 110 (2010) (emphasis added).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1) (2012). In 2013, the SEC denied an award on grounds that
information provided before Dodd-Frank was enacted is not "original information" under the
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that results in monetary sanctions exceeding $1 million.3 9 If so, the SEC
may pay the whistleblower no less than 10% and no more than 30% of the
total money collected.4 0 The SEC pays awards out of the Investor Protection
Fund, which Congress created for this purpose.4 1 Entering the fiscal year of
2014, the SEC held approximately $439 million in its Investor Protection
Fund for paying awards.4 2
To administer the program, the SEC established the Office of the
Whistleblower ("OWB") as a separate office within in its Division of
Enforcement.4 3 At the end of the fiscal year of 2014, the OWB had a staff of
14: a Chief, a Deputy Chief, nine attorneys, and three paralegals.4 4
Complaints must be submitted under penalty of perjury on the SEC's Form
2850, which is titled "Tip, Complaint or Referral" ("TCR").4 5 The
Enforcement Division's Office of Market Intelligence evaluates each TCR
"and assigns specific, credible, and timely" complaints to SEC investigative
staff.4 6 The OWB may assist this triage process by contacting the
whistleblower for more information.4 7 Later, the OWB serves as the liaison
between the whistleblower and SEC investigators.4 8
Once a whistleblower comes forward, the SEC assumes control. The
SEC decides whether to pursue an enforcement action, and the
whistleblower has no recourse if the SEC chooses not to act. Dodd-Frank,
thus, is unlike the False Claims Act, which permits a whistleblower to sue
the wrongdoer herself if the government chooses not to and still collect up
to 30% of the total recovery.4 9 In contrast, Dodd-Frank simply
commissioned a study of whether "it would be useful for Congress to
consider" empowering whistleblowers with a private right of action.50 The
statute. The whistleblower has appealed to the Second Circuit. See Stryker v. SEC, No. 13-4404
(2d Cir. heard on Sept. 29, 2014).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(1) (2012).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2012).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(2), (g) (2012).
42. SEC, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER
PROGRAM 26 (2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/whistleblower-annual-
report-2014.pdf (hereinafter 2014 WHISTLEBLOWER REPORT). The fund also finances the
suggestion program of the SEC's Office of Inspector General. The amount was $47,078.42 in FY
2014.
43. Id. at 1, 4.
44. Id. at 6; see also Stephanie Russell-Kraft, SEC Whistleblower Head to Punish Cos. that
Silence Tipsters, LAW360 Oct. 2014, available at
http://www.law360.com/securities/articles/587847 (referring to office director Sean McKessy
"and his 14 staff members").
45. SEC, FORM 2850, TiP, COMPLAINT, OR REFERRAL, available at http://www.sec.gov/
about/forms/formtcr.pdf. [hereinafter TCR].
46. 2014 WHISTLEBLOWER REPORT, supra note 42, at 24.
47. Id. at 25.
48. Id.
49. False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2) (2012).
50. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(d) (2012).
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SEC's Office of Inspector General has since recommended against creating
any such private claims."
The SEC likewise has substantial discretion in deciding whether to
make an award at all, and if so, how much to pay within the mandated
10%-30% range.5 2 The SEC's Final Rules identify various factors that, in
the SEC's discretion, "may increase" or "may decrease" the amount of any
award.53
Whistleblowers must be proactive in monitoring any subsequent
enforcement proceedings and applying for an award. The OWB posts and
circulates a notice of each SEC action that results in monetary sanctions of
over $1 million and so may be the basis of an award.5 4 The notice is called a
"Notice of Covered Action," or NoCA." A whistleblower must apply for an
award within 90 days of posting.5 6 The OWB reviews each application.5 7
Depending on the whistleblower's role and contribution, the OWB
recommends "whether the applicant should receive an award and, if so, the
percentage of the award."" The SEC's Claims Review Staff, consisting of
five senior officers, then issues its Preliminary Determination.5 9
A whistleblower may request reconsideration to contest denial of any
award or to seek a larger amount. 6 0 At the end of the process, the Claims
Review Staff issues a Proposed Final Determination for review by the five
SEC Commissioners. 6 1 The SEC then issues its Final Order. Denials may be
appealed to the Court of Appeals, where the dissatisfied applicant must
prove that the denial was arbitrary, capricious, and without rational basis-
among the strictest standards in law.62
51. SEC, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, SEC Rep. No. 511, EVALUATION OF THE SEC's
WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 28-30 (2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oig/
reports/audits/2013/51 1.pdf.
52. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-5 (2014).
53. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6 (2014). As discussed below in more detail, certain factors are
designed to encourage the whistleblower first to report securities law violations internally. Factors
that may increase the award are: (1) the extent of the assistance that the whistleblower provides to
the SEC in its investigation and enforcement proceeding (e.g., the whistleblower's role in
explaining complex transactions and interpreting key evidence, timeliness of initial report,
resources conserved because of the whistleblower's assistance, whether the whistleblower helped
cause others to cooperate, etc.); and (2) the SEC's law enforcement interest in deterring violations
of the securities laws by making awards. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(a) (2014). Factors that may
decrease the award are: (1) the whistleblower's culpability in the securities violations; and (2) the
whistleblower's unreasonable delay in reporting the violation. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(b) (2014).
54. 2014 WHISTLEBLOWER REPORT, supra note 42, at 6, 13.
55. Id
56. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-10(a), (b) (2014).
57. 2014 WHISTLEBLOWER REPORT, supra note 42, at 13.
58. Id
59. Id
60. Id at 13-14.
61. Id at 14.
62. Dodd-Frank, supra note 2, at § 923(f).
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B. Role of Internal Reporting
To qualify for an award, an employee need not report internally at her
company before going to the SEC. The question was heavily debated during
the SEC's rulemaking process. Despite lobbying by business groups, the
SEC declined to require internal reporting in its Final Rules governing
whistleblower award eligibility.
Business groups argued that, particularly since the SOX, companies had
"adopted robust compliance programs with mechanisms for employees to
promptly alert management and the board about potential or actual
misconduct without fear of retribution."6 3 They expressed concern that, if
employees could receive a substantial award by going directly to the SEC, it
would undermine companies' ability to detect, investigate, and remediate
securities law violations themselves. In voting against the Final Rule, one of
the SEC's two Republican Commissioners said that "the [F]inal [R]ule
permits a whistleblower to knowingly bypass a company's good-faith
attempts to identify and investigate alleged violations."6 4 Both Republican
Commissioners argued that companies nationwide collectively had more
resources than the SEC alone to address violations quickly and at a high
volume, rather than letting them fester and deepen.6 5
Still, three of the five Commissioners declined to require
whistleblowers to report a securities law violation internally before
complaining to the SEC. The SEC chose to let the employee decide, based
on her own individual circumstances and corporate environment, whether
first to pursue internal compliance. SEC Chairman Mary L. Shapiro said:
63. Business Roundtable Statement on Whistleblower Vote, Bus. ROUNDTABLE (May 25,
2011), http://www.fiercegovernmentit.com/press-releases/business-roundtable-statement-
whistleblower-vote. Business Roundtable charged that the Final Rule "impede[] the ethical
standards and transparency that American companies have worked diligently to foster." Id. The
U.S. Chamber of Commerce likewise complained that whistleblowers would now "keep
companies in the dark" and "leave[] expensive, robust compliance programs collecting dust." U.S.
Chamber Warns New SEC Whistleblower Rule Will Undermine Corporate Compliance Programs,
U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (May 24, 2011, 8:00 PM), https://www.uschamber.com/press-
release/us-chamber-warns-new-sec-whistleblower-rule-will-undermine-corporate-compliance.
The National Whistleblowers Center had a different take, deeming the Final Rule "a major
victory." SEC Rules Strengthen Whistleblower Protections, NAT'L WHISTLEBLOWERS CENTER
(May 25, 2011),
http://www.whistleblowers.org/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=1246&Itemid=20
7.
64. Troy A. Paredes, Comm'r, SEC, Speech by SEC Commissioner: Statement at Open
Meeting to Adopt Final Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (May 25, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch052511tap-item2.htm (hereinafter "Paredes Speech").
See also Kathleen L. Casey, Comm'r, SEC, Statement by SEC Commissioner: Adoption of Rules
for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (May 25, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch052511klc-
item2.htm (hereinafter "Casey Statement").
65. See Casey Statement, supra note 65; Paredes Speech, supra note 65.
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"This makes sense as well because it is the whistleblower who is in the best
position to know which route is best to pursue."6 6 Supporters reasoned this
approach would encourage companies to maintain strong internal
compliance programs and culture so that their employees will report first
internally.6 7 They also cited studies that whistleblowers overwhelmingly
report within their companies even when they are not required to do so and
have large monetary incentives to go to the government.68 If a
whistleblower lacks confidence in her company, the Final Rule provides a
direct route to the SEC. Commissioner Elisse B. Walter explained the SEC
could not encourage whistleblowers to come forward "without assuring
those who fear for their jobs, their livelihood[,] and their families' welfare
that they have an avenue to come directly to the government. After-the-fact
relief for retaliation alone is simply not sufficient." 69
Accordingly, the SEC decided to encourage, but not require, internal
reporting. In its Final Rules, participation in the company's internal
compliance systems is a factor that the SEC may use to increase a
whistleblower's award.7 0 The SEC may increase the award percentage if the
employee, for example, (1) "reported the possible securities law violations
through internal whistleblower, legal[,] or compliance procedures before, or
at the same time as, reporting" to the SEC; and (2) "assisted any internal
investigation or inquiry."7 1 Alternatively, the SEC may decrease the award
if the employee knowingly interfered with her company's internal
compliance and reporting systems by, for example, providing false
information.7 2 Likewise, if the whistleblower goes first to her company and
the company self-reports to the SEC, the whistleblower gets credit for all
66. Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, Speech by SEC Chairman Mary L. Schapiro,
Opening Statement at SEC Open Meeting: Item 2-Whistleblower Program (May 25, 2011),
availableathttp://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch052511mls-item2.htm.
67. Id. See also Luis A. Aguilar, Comm'r, SEC, Speech by SEC Commissioner:
Incentivizing Whistleblowers to Bring Fraud to Light (May 25, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spchO525111aa-item2.htm (hereinafter "Aguilar Speech");
Robert S. Khuzami, Director of Enforcement, SEC, Speech by SEC Staff: Remarks at Open
Meeting-Whistleblower Program (May 25, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/201 1/spchO5251 1rk.htm (hereinafter "Khuzami Speech").
68. Aguilar Speech, supra note 68.
69. Elisse B. Walter, Comm'r, SEC, Speech by SEC Commissioner: Opening Statement-
May 25, 2011 Open Meeting-Final Rules for Implementing the Whistleblower Provisions of
Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (May 25, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch052511 ebw-item2.htm (hereinafter "Walter
Speech").See also Khuzami Speech, supra note 68.
70. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(a)(4) (2014).
71. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(a) (2014). In this vein, the SEC's official whistleblower
complaint form asks whether the tipster has reported internally to a supervisor, compliance officer,
whistleblower, ombudsman, or someone else and seeks details. See TCR, supra note 45, at
Questions 5b & 5c.
72. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(b)(3) (2014).
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the information the company provides to the SEC-even if the initial
internal report was only the tip of the iceberg.7 3
C. The Whistleblower Program in Practice
The whistleblower incentives program became effective on August 12,
2011.74 In October 2014, the Chief of the OWB reported his office "has
seen a steady 5 to 10 percent increase in tips each year."7 5 Through the end
of the 2014 fiscal year, the OWB received 10,193 complaints, including
3620 in 2014, 3238 in 2013, and 3001 in 2012.76 In each of these years, the
most common complaint categories were Corporate Disclosures and
Financials, Offering Fraud, and Manipulation, which together compose
about half of all tips.7 7 Over this time, the OWB posted 570 NoCAs to its
website, including 139 in 2014.78
As of the end of the fiscal year of 2014, the SEC had issued awards to
fourteen whistleblowers.7 The SEC has disclosed that at least two awards
were for 30% of the recoveries-which is the maximum statute allows.0
Five of the award amounts were in the range of $50,000 to $400,000, and a
73. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(c)(3) (2014).
74. 2014 WHISTLEBLOWER REPORT, supra note 42, at 10, 20 n.39.
75. Stephanie Russell-Kraft, SEC Whistleblower Head Admits to Award-Payout Struggles,
LAW360 (2014), available at http://www.law360.com/articles/587846.
76. 2014 WHISTLEBLOWER REPORT, supra note 42, at 20. The SEC also received 334
complaints during the first seven weeks of the program, from August 12, 2011 through the end of
the fiscal year of 2011 on September 30, 2011.
77. Id. at 21-22, 27.
78. Id. at 13.
79. Id. at 10; see also Final Orders of the Commission, SEC (Nov. 18, 2013),
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/owb-final-orders.shtml (the SEC's orders denying or
granting whistleblower awards from various years).
80. 2014 WHISTLEBLOWER REPORT, supra note 42, at 11-12. One award totaling 30% was
shared among three claimants, with 15% to Claimant #1, 10% to Claimant #2, and 5% to Claimant
#3 (In the Matter of the Claim for Award in Connection with Redacted Redacted [sic] Notice of
Covered action Redacted, Exchange Act Release No. 72652, 2014 WL 3588057 (July 22, 2014),
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2014/34-72652.pdf). Another award reaching 30%
went to one whistleblower who stopped a multi-million fraud and, as of the end of FY 2014, had
collected over $385,000. 2014 WHISTLEBLOWER REPORT, supra note 42, at 12; Order
Determining Whistleblower Award Claim, SEC Rel. Co. 67698, File No. 2012-1 (Aug. 21, 2012).
Another reported award percentage was for 20% (In the Matter of the Claim for Award in
Connection with Redacted Notice of Covered Action Redacted, Exchange Act Release No. 72947,
2014 WL 4258232 (Aug. 29, 2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2014/34-
72947.pdf); one was for 15% (In the Matter of the Claim for Award in Connection with Redacted
Redacted [sic] Notice of Covered Action Redacted, Exchange Act Release No. 72301, 2014 WL
2466464 (June 3, 2014), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2014/34-72301.pdf); and two
were not disclosed (In the Matter of the Claim for Award in Connection with Redacted, Exchange
Act Release No. 73174, 2014 WL 4678597 (Sept. 22, 2014), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2014/34-73174.pdf; In the Matter of the Claim for Award in
Connection with Redacted (Administrative Proceeding File No. Redacted) Notice of Covered
Action Redacted, Exchange Act Release No. 72727, 2014 WL 3749705 (July 31, 2014), available
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2014/34-72727.pdf).
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sixth award was for $875,000." Two award amounts dwarfed the others. On
September 30, 2013, the SEC awarded over $14 million to one
whistleblower.8 2 On September 22, 2014, the SEC awarded $30 million to
another whistleblower, stating that the amount would have been higher but
for an "unreasonable" delay in reporting the violations.8 3
According to the SEC, "over 40% of the individuals who received
awards were current or former company employees" and "an additional
20% ... were contractors, consultants, or were solicited to act as
consultants for the company committing the securities violation."8 4 Over
80% of the current or former employees to receive an award reported
internally before going to the SEC.15
D. Anti-retaliation Protections for Whistleblowers
To protect whistleblowers against employer retaliation, Dodd-Frank
provides whistleblowers with a private right of action with meaningful
recovery.8 6 The statute defines "whistleblower" as "any individual who
provides, or 2 or more individuals acting jointly who provide, information
relating to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission, in a manner
established, by rule or regulation, by the Commission."8 7 A whistleblower
may recover if she suffers an adverse employment action because she
either: (i) gave information to the SEC; (ii) participated in the SEC's
subsequent investigation or proceeding; or (iii) made any disclosure that is
required or protected under SOX, the Exchange Act, or any other law, rule,
or regulation within the SEC's jurisdiction.
Statutory remedies include reinstatement with equivalent seniority,
double back pay with interest, and litigation fees and costs.8 9 The
limitations period is long: a whistleblower may sue within six years of the
violation or within three years of reasonable discovery. 90 In contrast, an
employee who sues for retaliation under SOX may recover (among other
remedies) back pay with interest but not two times back pay.91 A SOX
retaliation plaintiff must also file a complaint with the Department of Labor
81. 2014 WHISTLEBLOWER REPORT, supra note 42, at 11-12.
82. Id. at 12; Order Determining Whistleblower Award Claim, SEC Rel. No. 70554, File No.
2013-4 (Sept. 30, 2013).
83. 2014 WHISTLEBLOWER REPORT, supra note 42, at 10; Order Determining
Whistleblower Award Claim, SEC Rel. No. 73174, File No. 2014-10 (Sept. 22, 2014).
84. 2014 WHISTLEBLOWER REPORT, supra note 42, at 16.
85. Id.
86. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(i) (2012).
87. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012).
88. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (2012).
89. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C) (2012).'
90. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(iii) (2012).
91. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, PUB. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, § 806 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1514A(c) (2013)) [hereinafter SOX].
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within 180 days.9 2
The SEC's regulations include additional protection not found in the
statute. First, the SEC may enforce the anti-retaliation provisions through
civil enforcement actions in federal court or administrative proceedings.9 3
The SEC cited its statutory authority to enforce the Exchange Act generally,
which now includes Dodd-Frank's anti-retaliation provisions.9 4 In June
2014, the SEC commenced administrative proceedings against a hedge
fund, alleging that it demoted its head trader after learning that the trader
reported a conflict of interest to the SEC.9 5 The hedge fund and its principal
ultimately agreed to pay $2.2 million to settle the charges.9 6
Second, the Final Rules prohibit "any action to impede" employees
from reporting securities law violations to the SEC, including through
"enforcing, or threatening to enforce, a confidentiality agreement"-such as
those commonly included in severance contracts with departing
employees.9 7 The OWB Chief has stressed the SEC is "on the hunt for cases
to bring against illegal employment or confidentiality agreements."9 8 He has
said: "We are going to bring a case where somebody has asked an employee
or forced an employee to sign a document that in order of substance means
they can't report to us [. . .] This is now the new thing that I've got people
really enthusiastic for." 99
III. DOES DODD-FRANK PROTECT AN EMPLOYEE WHO DOES NOT REPORT
TO THE SEC?
Dodd-Frank's provision prohibiting retaliation against
"whistleblowers" highlights the tension between the exclusive authority
vested in the SEC and the practical and policy concerns that favor an active
role for private actors in strengthening our financial system. Courts
nationwide have encountered multiple lawsuits by employees who sued for
retaliation under Dodd-Frank even though they did not go to the SEC. The
employees reported suspected wrongdoing only internally and allege they
were fired because of it.
92. Dodd-Frank, supra note 2, § 922(c).
93. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b)(2) (2014).
94. 2014 WHISTLEBLOWER REPORT, supra note 42, at 18.
95. SEC Charges Hedge Fund Adviser With Conducting Conflicted Transactions and
Retaliating Against Whistleblower, SEC (June 16, 2014)
http://www.sec.gov /News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370542096307; In the Matter of
Paradigm Capital Management, Inc. and Candace King Weir, Respondents, Exchange Act Release
No. 72393, Investment Act Release No. 3857, 2014 WL 270411 (June 16, 2014), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2014/34-72393.pdf.
96. 2014 WHISTLEBLOWER REPORT, supra note 42, at 18.
97. 17 C.F.R. §240.21F-17(a) (2014).
98. Stephanie Russell-Kraft, SEC Whistleblower Head to Punish Cos. that Silence Tipsters,
LAW360 (2014), available at http://www.law360.com/securities/articles/587847.
99. Id.
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Are these employees "whistleblowers" entitled to Dodd-Frank's
statutory protection against retaliation? Not under the statutory definition of
"whistleblower," which requires disclosure to the SEC. As noted earlier,
Dodd-Frank defines "whistleblower" as "any individual who provides, or 2
[sic] or more individuals acting jointly who provide, information relating to
a violation of the securities laws to the Commission, in a manner
established, by rule or regulation, by the Commission." 0 0
Even though the statute defines a "whistleblower" as one who reports to
the SEC, it also protects disclosures that are not made to the SEC. The
statute protects a "whistleblower" from retaliation for reports not just to the
SEC but also to other government agencies-and, critically, to internal
company officials. The statute reads:
No employer may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass,
directly or indirectly, or in any other manner discriminate against, a
whistleblower in the terms and conditions of employment because
of any lawful act done by the whistleblower-
(i) in providing information to the Commission in accordance
with this section;
(ii) in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any investigation
or judicial or administrative action of the Commission based
upon or related to such information; or
(iii) in making disclosures that are required or protected under
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.), this
chapter, including section 78j-1(m) of this title, section 1513(e)
of title 18, and any other law, rule, or regulation subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission. 101
Subsections (i) and (ii) plainly protect whistleblowers who provide
information to the SEC or otherwise directly interact with the SEC. The
problem is subsection (iii), which does not require a whistleblower to report
to or interact with the SEC. It protects, for example, disclosures under SOX,
which covers disclosures made only internally, without any report to the
SEC. 102 Indeed, the main thrust of SOX was mandating internal compliance,
100. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012) (emphasis added).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (2012) (emphasis supplied).
102. SOX, PUB. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. Courts have noted that "subsection (iii)
contains a catch-all provisions which protects any disclosures required by any law, rule, or
regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC." Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC, 20 F. Supp. 3d
719 (D. Neb. 2014). As another example, "FINRA Rule 8210 is a rule 'subject to the jurisdiction
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corporate governance, and audit functions in the wake of the massive
accounting frauds at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and other companies. SOX
protects from retaliation employees of public companies who disclose
internal securities violations or other fraud against shareholders.1 0 3 As noted
earlier, SOX's anti-retaliation provisions have a much shorter limitations
period and lower potential damages compared to Dodd-Frank's.
Does subsection (iii) entitle employees who report misconduct
internally, as protected under SOX, to sue under Dodd-Frank's expansive
anti-retaliation provisions-even if they did not also notify the SEC? The
question turns on whether Dodd-Frank requires a "whistleblower" to
communicate with the SEC.
The SEC itself says no. Its Final Rules implementing the whistleblower
program do not require disclosure to the SEC for statutory protection
against retaliation. The Final Rule states that:
[f]or the purposes of the retaliation protections afforded by [Dodd-
Frank], you are a whistleblower if:
(i) You possess a reasonable belief that the information you are
providing relates to a possible securities law violation (or,
where applicable, to a possible violation of the provisions set
forth in 18 U.S.C. 1514A(a)) that has occurred, is ongoing, or is
about to occur, and;
(ii) You provide that information in a manner described in
Section 21F(h)(1)(A) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. 78u-
6(h)(1)(A)). 104
In its comments, the SEC stated that "the rule reflects the fact that the
statutory anti-retaliation protections apply to three different categories of
whistleblowers, and the third category includes individuals who report to
persons or governmental authorities other than the Commission.",os
of the Commission,"' which requires the disclosure to FINRA (and not the SEC) "of information
related to any investigation authorized by FINRA's by-laws or rules."
103. SOX § 806 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A).
104. 17 C.F.R. §240.21F-2(b)(1) (2014).
105. SEC Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34300-01
(codified at 17 C.F.R. 240, 249 (2014), available at 2011 WL 2293084, at *34304 (June 13,
2011)).
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A. The Vast Majority ofDistrict Courts Conclude an Employee Need Not
Communicate with the SEC to Sue for Retaliation under Dodd-Frank
The vast majority of federal district courts, to consider the issue, have
agreed with the SEC. These courts held that a plaintiff may sue for
retaliation as a Dodd-Frank "whistleblower" even though she did not
provide information to the SEC.1 0 6 In these cases, the employees reported
alleged infractions internally within their companies, but they did not report
to SEC or in the manner required by the SEC.10 7 Each employee was fired,
and then sued under a variety of common-law and statutory theories,
including for retaliatory termination under Dodd-Frank.108 This table
summarizes what each employee said, and to whom:
Case Allegations Reported To
Egan v. Trading CEO was diverting company President of company,
screen, Inc., Fed. income to another company then to independent
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T under the CEO's control. directors, and last to
96,307 (S.D.N.Y. Latham & Watkins,
May 4, 2011). which was hired by
independent directors to
106. E.g., Connolly v. Remkes, 2014 WL 5473144 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2014); Peters v.
LifeLock Inc., No. 2:14-cv-00576, Dkt. 47, slip op. 6-13 (D. Ariz. Sept. 19, 2014); Bussing v.
COR Clearing, LLC, 20 F. Supp. 3d 719 (D. Neb. 2014); Yang v. Navigators Group, Inc.., 18 F.
Supp. 3d 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding Corp., 2014 WL 940703
(D.N.J. Mar. 11, 2014); Azim v. Tortoise Capital Advisors, LLC, 2014 WL 707235 (D. Kan. Feb.
24, 2014); Rosenblum v. Thomson Reuters (Markets) LLC, 984 F. Supp. 2d 141 (S.D.N.Y. 2013);
Ellington v. Giacoumakis, 977 F. Supp. 2d 42 (D. Mass. 2013); Murray v. UBS Secs., LLC, Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 97,423 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013); Genberg v. Porter, 935 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (D.
Colo. 2013); Nollner v. S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 986 (M.D. Tenn. 2012);
Kramer v. Trans-lux Corp., 96 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 44,627 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2012); Egan
v. Tradingscreen, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 96,307 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011).
107. In Egan, there was a factual dispute about whether the employee had actually reported
the infractions to the SEC. (The types of allegations that Egan made did not qualify for protection
under subsection (A)(iii).) The employee's up-the-chain disclosure prompted an internal
investigation of his claims, and the investigation substantiated the claims. Egan, Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 96,307 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011). The employee alleged the investigators most likely had
reported the infractions to the SEC, and that such a report could qualify under Dodd-Frank's
allowance for "joint" notice to the SEC. But the employee alleged nothing more than his suspicion
that a report had been made. The employee was granted leave to amend his complaint. After the
amendment, Egan's case was dismissed because he failed to allege that he acted jointly with
someone who provided information to the SEC. Egan, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 96,307
(S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011). In Kramer, meanwhile, the employee sent the SEC a letter outlining his
allegations, but a letter, all parties agreed, was not the manner of communication required by the
SEC. Kramer, 96 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 44,627. In the other cases, the employees said
nothing to the SEC.
108. E.g., Murray, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 97,423; Genberg, 935 F. Supp. 2d 1094; Nollner, 852
F. Supp. 2d 986; Kramer, 96 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 44,627; Egan, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶
96,307.
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investigate the claims.
Nollner v. S. Baptist Executives bribed foreign Two supervisors.
Convention, Inc., 852 officials to obtain building
F. Supp. 2d 986 permits and other favors in
(M.D. Tenn. 2012). violation of Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act.
Kramer v. Trans-lux CEO and CFO caused a CEO and CFO, then the
Corp., 96 Empl. missed distribution to company's audit
Prac. Dec. (CCH) T company's pension plan, and committee, and last a
44,627 (D. Conn. then amended pension plan letter to the SEC.
Sept. 25, 2012). without notifying the SEC.
Genberg v. Porter, Company violated SEC proxy Head of the board's audit
935 F. Supp. 2d 1094 rules, and CEO engaged in committee by letter.
(D. Colo. 2013). insider trading and violated
other securities laws.
Murray v. UBS Sees., UBS coerced its analyst into Two supervisors,
LLC, Fed. Sec. L. skewing research reports so including a managing
Rep. T 97,423 that they were favorable to director.
(S.D.N.Y. May 21, UBS's trading and loan-
2013). origination businesses.
Ellington v. Company was distributing SEC. One day after the
Giacoumakis, 977 F. misleading investment reports employee made
Supp. 2d 42 (D. to existing and prospective allegations internally, he
Mass. 2013). clients. was terminated. This lead
to the recovery of some
$200,000 in civil
penalties for willful
violations of securities
regulations.
Rosenblum v. Certain customers received The FBI and the
Thomson Reuters financial information before company's ethics
(Markets) LLC, 984 others, giving them an committee.
F. Supp. 2d 141 advantage in financial
(S.D.N.Y. 2013). transactions.
Khazin v. TD Financial product was Supervisor
Ameritrade Holding improperly priced, would
Corp., 2014 WL result customers paying
940703 (D.N.J. Mar. additional overhead, and so
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11, 2014). did not comply with securities
regulations
Yang v. Navigators Market risk assessments of CFO, various oversight
Group, Inc., 18 F. certain investment portfolios committees, and general
Supp. 3d 519 used improper models and so counsel
(S.D.N.Y. 2014). substantially underestimated
investment risks
Bussing v. COR Violations of various bank Company management,
Clearing, LLC, 20 F. secrecy and anti-money including CEO, COO,
Supp. 3d 719 (D. laundering statutes and and directors
Neb. 2014). regulations
Azim v. Tortoise False representations to Supervisor
Capital Advisors, potential investors and false
LLC, 2014 WL filings with the SEC
707235 (D. Kan.
Feb. 24, 2014).
Peters v. LifeLock Initial risk assessment CFO and to supervisor,
Inc., No. 2:14-cv- revealed fraud against the Chief Information
00576, Dkt. 47 (D. shareholders, including Officer
Ariz. Sept. 19, 2014). failures to audit and
manipulating client alerts to
elderly customers
Connolly v. Remkes, Financial advisor made Compliance officers and
2014 WL 5473144 payment directly into client's to owner
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, account, violating rules of the
2014). Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority
The employers all moved to dismiss the Dodd-Frank claims. They
argued the employees were not "whistleblowers," because the employees
had not properly reported the alleged infractions to the SEC. The employees
countered that reporting the violations to the SEC was not necessary
because § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) protects disclosure made only internally.
In each case listed above, the court concluded Dodd-Frank's
whistleblower protections do not require the plaintiff to provide information
to the SEC. While the definition of "whistleblower" requires the individual
to report a violation "to the Commission," several courts noted a
"contradiction" in § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii). 10 9 That was because section (A)(iii)
protects whistleblowing disclosures made under the SOX regime, which
109. See Egan, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 96,307, at *9; see also Nollner, 852 F. Supp. at 994
n.9; Kramer, 96 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 44,627, at *9; Genberg, 935 F. Supp. 2d at 1106;
Murray, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. T 97,423, at *3.
No. 2] 211
212 UNIV OF ST THOMAS JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. VIII
requires only that the employee report a possible violation to a
supervisor.110 A "literal reading" of the definition of a "whistleblower,"
according to the one court, would "effectively invalidate § 78u-
6(h)(1)(A)(iii)'s protection of whistleblower disclosures that do not require
reporting to the SEC.""' The court read (A)(iii) as a "narrow" exception to
the requirement that a report be made to the SEC. It held: "[t]he
contradictory provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act are best harmonized by
reading 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii)'s protection of certain
whistleblower disclosures not requiring reporting to the SEC as a narrow
exception to 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6)'s definition of a whistleblower as one
who reports to the SEC."112 Another court went so far as to substitute the
"ordinary meaning" of whistleblower for its statutory definition,113 stating,
if this was not done, "subsection (iii) [would] be rendered insignificant, and
its purpose-to shield a broad range of employee disclosures-will be
thwarted."114
Other courts reached the same result, but did so by deferring to the
SEC's Final Rule interpreting the whistleblower provisions. These courts
applied Chevron deference, determining the statute to be ambiguous,
finding the SEC rule to be a permissible construction and therefore ruling
the agency's interpretation as binding.' 15 Another court similarly found the
"SEC's construction ... persuasive." 1 16 That was because it was "apparent"
that Congress intended "that an employee terminated for reported SOX
violations to a supervisor or an outside compliance officer, and ultimately
to the SEC, have a private right of action under Dodd-Frank whether or not
the employer wins the race to the SEC's door with a termination notice."117
In several cases, the courts interpreted the anti-retaliation provision so
that (A)(iii) would not be rendered "inoperable and moot."" Some courts
cited Dodd-Frank's stated goals to "improve the accountability and
transparency of the financial system" and "create 'new incentives and
110. Egan, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 96,307, at *10.
111. Id. at *10-11.
112. Id. at *13.
113. Bussing, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 729.
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., Remkes, 2014 WL 5473144, at *6; Yang, 18 F. Supp. 3d at 534; Khazin, 2014
WL 940803, at *6;
Kramer, 96 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 44,627, at *10-12; Murray, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 97,423, at
*6-7. Under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., if a statute is ambiguous,
courts defer to the interpretation of the agency that administers the statute as long as it is based on
a permissible construction. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
116. Ellington v. Giacoumakis, 977 F. Supp. 2d 42 (D. Mass. 2013)
117. Id. at *9-10.
118. Genberg v. Porter, 935 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1106 (D. Colo. 2013); See also Nollner v. S.
Baptist Convention, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 986, 994 (M.D. Tenn. 2012) (avoiding an interpretation
that would make (A)(iii) "superfluous"); Murray, 2013 WL2190084 at *5-6 (same).
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protections for whistleblowers."' 1 9 They therefore dismissed arguments
that expanding "whistleblower" under Dodd-Frank to include employees
who report only internally would allow plaintiffs to pursue the same
retaliation claims they would have sought under SOX-but with a longer
statute of limitations, no administrative exhaustion requirement, and more
generous relief.12 0 The "problem is not a problem at all" because Dodd-
Frank "appears to have been intended to expand upon the protections of
[SOX]." 121
B. The Fifth Circuit Concludes that Whistleblowers Must Report to the
SEC to Assert a Private Right ofAction under Dodd-Frank
Before September 2015, only one federal court of appeals had
addressed whether a whistleblower who does not report to the SEC may sue
under Dodd-Frank-the Fifth Circuit in Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA),
LLC. 1 2 2 Asadi alleged GE Energy violated Dodd-Frank by terminating him
after he internally reported a possible securities law violation. 1 2 3 Asadi was
GE Energy's Iraq Country Executive in Jordan. 1 24 He alleged that GE
Energy had hired a woman closely associated with a senior Iraqi official to
gain favor in negotiating a joint venture. 1 2 5 Believing this conduct violated
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Asadi reported it to his supervisor and a
corporate ombudsperson. 1 26 According to Asadi, he then received a
"surprisingly negative" performance review and was pressured to step down
and accept a job with minimal responsibility. 127 Asadi refused, and GE
Energy fired him. 1 28
GE Energy moved to dismiss, arguing that Asadi did not qualify as a
"whistleblower" under Dodd-Frank and that Dodd-Frank's whistleblower
protection does not apply extraterritorially. 1 29 The district court dismissed
Asadi's whistleblower-retaliation claim on the latter ground and declined to
reach whether Asadi qualified as a "whistleblower." 1 30
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit framed the question as whether "an
individual who is not a 'whistleblower' under the statutory definition of that
119. Kramer, 96 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 44,627, at *10-11 (citation omitted); See also
Murray, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 97,423, at *6.
120. See, e.g., Kramer, 96 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 44,627, at *12; Murray, Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. ¶ 97,423, at *6-7.
121. Kramer, 96 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 44,627, at *12.
122. 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013).
123. Id. at 621.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), LLC, 720 F.3d 620, 621 (5th Cir. 2013).
129. Id.
130. Id.
No. 2] 213
214 UNIV OF ST THOMAS JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. VIII
term in § 78u-6(a)(6) may, in some circumstances, nevertheless seek relief
under the whistleblower-protection provision."1 3 1 Relying on subsection
(A)(iii), Asadi argued he qualified as a whistleblower even though he did
not provide information to the SEC.13 2
The Fifth Circuit disagreed. Relying on the statute's plain language, the
court concluded that only individuals who provide information relating to a
securities law violation to the SEC are "whistleblowers." 13 3 The Fifth
Circuit found no conflict between the definition of "whistleblower" as one
who reports to the SEC, and the protection of disclosures that are not made
to the SEC.1 3 4 The court stressed that the three categories of protected
activity follow the phrase "[n]o employer may discharge . . . a
whistleblower because of any act done by the whistleblower."13 5 The Fifth
Circuit found it "significant" that Congress had chosen to use the word
"whistleblower" instead of "individual" or "employee." Since Congress had
used the term "whistleblower" throughout the subsection, the court
determined that it had to "give that language effect."1 3 6
The Fifth Circuit further concluded that the "interplay between § 78u-
6(a)(6) [defining 'whistleblower' as one who reports to the SEC] and § 78u-
6(h)(1)(A)(iii) [protecting disclosures not made to the SEC] did not render §
78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) superfluous."137 The category of protected activity under
§ 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) had effect even if the protections from retaliation
apply only to individuals who ultimately report to the SEC.1 3 8 For example,
(A)(iii) would apply to a mid-level manager who discovered a securities
law violation and reported the violation to the company's CEO and to the
SEC.13 9 If the manager were fired before the CEO became aware of the
disclosure to the SEC, the manager could not prove retaliation because he
reported to the SEC.1 4 0 The manager could obtain relief only under (A)(iii):
a "whistleblower" (because he also disclosed to the SEC) who made an
internal disclosure protected under the anti-retaliation provision of SOX.1 4 1
The Asadi court refused to "read the words 'to the Commission' out of the
definition of 'whistleblower' for the purposes of the whistleblower-
protection provision."1 4 2 The court concluded this construction would
131. Id at 623.
132. Id at 624, 626.
133. Id at 629.
134. Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), LLC, 720 F.3d 620, 626 (5th Cir. 2013).
135. Id (emphasis in original).
136. Id
137. Id at 627.
138. Id
139. Id
140. Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), LLC, 720 F.3d 620, 627-28 (5th Cir. 2013).
141. Id
142. Id
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violate the "surplusage [sic] cannon."143
The Fifth Circuit also determined that construing Dodd-Frank's
whistleblower-protection provision to extend beyond the statutory
definition of "whistleblowers" would render "[SOX's] anti-retaliation
provision, for practical purposes, moot."1 4 4 The court explained: "[A]n
individual who makes a disclosure that is protected by [SOX] anti-
retaliation provision could also bring a Dodd-Frank whistleblower-
protection claim on the basis that the disclosure was protected by [SOX]."1 4 5
The court doubted a person would choose to bring an anti-retaliation claim
under SOX instead of Dodd-Frank because: (1) the Dodd-Frank
whistleblower protection permits larger monetary damages; (2) individuals
who bring an anti-retaliation claim under SOX must meet certain procedural
requirements; and (3) Dodd-Frank's whistleblower protection claims have a
much longer limitations period.146
The Asadi court finally refused to defer to the SEC's regulation
construing the Dodd-Frank whistleblower-protection provision.1 4 The SEC
adopted a final rule that expands the definition of a "whistleblower" to
include individuals who do not report to the SEC, but the Fifth Circuit
concluded the statute's plain language did not support this expansion. The
court rejected the "SEC's expansive interpretation of the term
'whistleblower' for purposes of the whistleblower-protection provision"
because § 78u-6(a)(6) unambiguously expresses Congress's "intention to
require individuals to report information to the SEC to qualify as a
whistleblower under Dodd-Frank." 1 4 8
The Fifth Circuit therefore concluded the "plain language" of § 78u-6
limits protection under the Dodd-Frank whistleblower-protection provision
to those individuals who provide information relating to a violation of the
securities laws to the SEC. 14 9 Asadi did not qualify as a whistleblower and
his whistleblower protection claim under Dodd-Frank had been properly
dismissed by the district court, because he did not provide information to
the SEC.15 o
At least five district courts have since followed Asadi, holding that the
statutory definition of "whistleblower" is itself unambiguous. 15 1 One such
143. Id at 628.
144. Id
145. Id at 628.
146. Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), LLC, 720 F.3d 620, 629 (5th Cir. 2013).
147. Id
148. Id
149. Id
150. Id
151. Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 404 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), rev'd, _ F.3d _,
2015 WL 5254916 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 2015); Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Servs., 65 F. Supp. 3d 640,
643-46 (E.D. Wis. 2014); Englehart v. Career Educ. Corp., 2014 WL 2619501, at **3-9 (M.D.
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court explained: "Reporting to the SEC is the precondition that triggers the
anti-retaliation provisions of the statute. Only when one has reported to the
SEC is that employee protected under all three prongs of the anti-retaliation
provision."1 5 2 The court characterized the real dispute as one over public
policy. It wrote:
The surprising number of courts accepting the ambiguity argument
appear to believe that because one may engage in protected activity
and yet not qualify as a whistleblower, then there is something
"ambiguous" in the statute. But that is an argument based solely on
a disagreement about public policy, not statutory interpretation....
Congress could not have defined "whistleblower" more clearly, and
yet the SEC apparently believes that entire definition should be cast
aside on the flimsy grounds that Congress really didn't mean it. 15 3
Another court stressed that SOX independently protects against
retaliation of individuals who report internally, "subject to the requirement
that they first file a complaint with the Department of Labor before bringing
a private right of action." 154 This court observed that "it appears to be the
exception, not the rule, for Congress to grant an individual a private right of
action to sue for damages arising from retaliation without requiring that
individual to make contact with a federal agency first."155
C. Creating a Circuit Split, the Second Circuit Holds that the Statute Is
Ambiguous and Defers to the SEC.
After the Fifth Circuit decided Asadi, other Courts of Appeals initially
declined opportunities to address whether Dodd-Frank's whistleblower anti-
retaliation provision requires disclosure to the SEC. The Eighth Circuit
refused an interlocutory appeal by an employer whose motion to dismiss
was denied, even though the district court certified the question for
interlocutory review. 15 6 Like the Fifth Circuit in Asadi, the Second Circuit
encountered an appeal where an employee stationed abroad reported only
Fla. May 12, 2014); Banko v. Apple Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 749, 756-57 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2013);
Wagner v. Bank ofAm. Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 97,571 (D. Colo. July 19, 2013).
152. Verfuerth, 65 F. Supp. 3d at 645.
153. Id. at 644.
154. E.g., Berman, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 409.
155. Id.
156. Bussing v. COR Clearing, LLC, 20 F. Supp. 3d 719 (D. Neb. 2014), interlocutory appeal
denied, No. 14-8015 (8th Cir. Sept. 4, 2014) (reversing the magistrate judge's report and
recommendation, which had ruled that Asadi had correctly decided the issue and that the
employee could not sue under Dodd-Frank's private right of action because she had not reported
to the SEC.).
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internally.15 7 Unlike the Fifth Circuit, the Second Circuit affirmed on
grounds that Dodd-Frank does not apply extraterritorially and chose not to
address whether the employees "internal reporting of alleged misconduct,
with or without his subsequent disclosures to the SEC, qualified him as a
'whistleblower' under the Dodd-Frank Act.""'
The Second Circuit finally addressed the issue in September 2015, in a
divided opinion that split with Asadi. In Berman v. NeoOgilvy LLC, the
majority of a three-judge panel found ambiguity in § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii)
and so deferred to the SEC. 15 9 Berman alleged that he was fired as finance
director after he discovered accounting fraud at his employer and reported
his discovery internally. 1 60 Berman went to the SEC six months after he
was terminated, at which point the limitations period for retaliation claims
under SOX already had expired. 1 6 1
Citing the SEC's Final Rule, the majority held that Berman could purse
Dodd-Frank remedies for retaliation even though he reported to the SEC
only after his termination. 1 62  The Second Circuit drew on the Supreme
Court's recent decision in King v. Burwell.1 63 In King, the Court held that
income tax subsidies under the Affordable Care Act ("ACA") were
available to those who purchased health insurance on exchanges established
by the federal government-even though the express statutory language
referred only to exchanges "established by a state." 164 The Second Circuit
explained that, in King, the Supreme Court departed from the text because,
otherwise, "the operation of the entire statute would be undermined" and so
the Court "interpreted the Affordable Care Act as whole to provide income
tax subsidies to those who purchased health insurance on federal
exchanges." 1 6 5
Applying this analysis to Dodd-Frank's whistleblower retaliation
provision, the Second Circuit reasoned that requiring employees to report to
the SEC would leave § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) "with an extremely limited
scope." 16 6 Unlike the Fifth Circuit in Asadi, the Second Circuit did not
deem it sufficient to protect individuals who report simultaneously to the
157. Liu Meng-Lin v. Siemens AG, 763 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2014).
158. Id at 183.
159. Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, _ F.3d _, 2015 WL 5254916 (2d Cir. Sept. 10,
2015).
160. Id at *4.
161. Id
162. Id at *4-*9.
163. Id at *1, *5, *9 (citing King v. Burwell, _ U.S. _, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015)).
164. Id at *5.
165. Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, _ F.3d _, 2015 WL 5254916, at *5 (2d Cir. Sept. 10,
2015).
166. Id
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SEC and to their employer.16 7 Most significant to the Second Circuit, this
reading would exclude employees "who cannot report wrongdoing to the
[SEC] until after they have reported the wrongdoing to their employer,"
chiefly auditors and attorneys.1 6 8 The court concluded that, as a practical
matter, "there would be virtually no situation where an SEC reporting
requirement would leave subdivision (iii) with any scope."169 Just as the
Supreme Court in King departed from the ACA's plain text so as to avoid
undermining "the operation of the entire statute," the Second Circuit
majority found ambiguity in the Dodd-Frank's plain definition of
"whistleblower" so as to avoid drastically limiting the scope of subdivision
(iii).17 0 It therefore deferred to the SEC and held that an employee's failure
to report to the SEC before termination did not bar a claim for retaliation
under Dodd-Frank's whistleblower provision.1 7 1
In dissent, Judge Jacobs characterized the majority as "rewriting" the
provision.1 7 2 Calling Asadi's interpretation "the more natural reading," the
dissent stressed that § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) applies only to "whistleblowers" as
defined by statute, and not to generic "employees."1 7 3 Instead, employees
are protected by SOX's anti-retaliation provision, with its shorter
limitations period and other restrictions.1 7 4 The dissent challenged the
majority's focus on the "extremely limited scope" of subdivision (iii) if it
were to protect only those who report to the SEC.1 7 5 Judge Jacobs wrote:
"The U.S. Code is full of statutory provisions with 'extremely limited'
effect; there is no canon that counsels reinforcement of any sub-sub-sub-
subsection that lacks a paradigm-shift."1 7 6 Finally, the dissent argued that
King v. Burwell did not authorize judges to redraft statutes in order to avoid
results that may be "sub-optimal."1 7 7 Instead, the Supreme Court sought to
167. Id at *5-*7.
168. Id at *6.
169. Id at *7.
170. Id at *9. The Second Circuit also observed that the legislative history was of no help,
and that the inconsistency first appeared without comment or explanation in conference to
reconcile the Senate and House versions. Id at *7, *9. The court speculated that "no one noticed
that the new subdivision and the definition of 'whistleblower' do not fit together neatly." Id. at
*9. It continued: "Ultimately, we think it doubtful that the conferees who accepted the last-minute
insertion of subdivision (iii) would have expected it to have the extremely limited scope it would
have if it were restricted by the [SEC] reporting requirement in the 'whistleblower' definition in
subsection 21F(a)(6)." Id.
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2015).
172. Id at *10.
173. Id at *11.
174. Id at *12.
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prevent a small phrase buried in a statute from undoing the entire scheme.1 7 8
The dissent observed: "The Court adapted wording to avoid what it
considered the upending of a ramified, hugely consequential enactment:
'Congress passed the Affordable Care Act to improve health insurance
markets, not to destroy them."'1 7 9 In Dodd-Frank, by contrast, "Congress
expressed its meaning [of 'whistleblower'] in a 'prominent manner' in the
definitions section," which, the dissent explained, is precisely where the
Supreme Court said that judges should look for "categorical guidance as to
congressional intent."so The dissent concluded: "'If the statutory language
is plain, we must enforce it according to its terms."8
IV. REQUIRING WHISTLEBLOWERS TO REPORT TO THE SEC COMPORTS
WITH CONGRESS'S POLICY CHOICE IN DODD-FRANK TO ENFORCE
THROUGH REGULATORY BODIES, NOT PRIVATE PARTIES.
The split among the Second and the Fifth Circuits likely will trigger
Supreme Court review in the near future.182 Until then, it remains unsettled
whether Dodd-Frank's "whistleblower" protection extends to those who
report only internally. As the dispute continues, it underscores the choices
that Congress made in changing the financial system-principally, to
prevent another "breakdown" through more regulation and government
enforcement.
The Fifth Circuit's Asadi decision hews to the statute's text, particularly
its definition and calculated use of the term "whistleblower" as one who
reports to the SEC, and it is consistent with Dodd-Frank's overall
framework. Some district courts cited Dodd-Frank's ultimate goals of
improving the financial system's accountability and transparency as a
reason to protect employees who report only internally, but these courts
ignored how Congress chose to achieve those goals: by further empowering
the SEC, and other government entities, to police the financial system,
rather than relying on companies and individuals. In the same vein, the
Second Circuit in Berman cited King v. Burwell as a basis to avoid limiting
the scope of one subsection, but the panel majority did so without
considering Dodd-Frank's overarching framework as a whole, which is
predominantly regulatory.
From this perspective, § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) is not an outlier. In defining
178. Id at *13-*14.
179. Id at *13 (quoting King, 135 S. Ct. at 2496).
180. Id at *14.
181. Id (quoting King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489).
182. For a discussion of the significance of a circuit split in the Supreme Court's decisions to
grant or deny a petition for certiorari, see Emily Grant, Scott A. Hendrickson, and Michael S.
Lynch, The Ideological Divide: Conflict and the Supreme Court's Certiorari Decision , 60 CLEV.
ST. L. REv. 559 (2012).
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"whistleblower" as one who reports to the SEC, the statute reinforces
Congress's focus on combating securities fraud through governmental, not
private, means. It also reflects Congress's understanding that inadequate
regulation was a primary cause of the financial "breakdown"-and in
particular that it was the SEC's disregard of whistleblowers like Harry
Markopolos that allowed massive frauds to flourish. Congress sought to
correct these deficiencies by strengthening the SEC. In summarizing Dodd-
Frank's Title IX (which includes the whistleblower incentives and
protection), the Senate Banking Committee Report focused solely on the
SEC's role: "The SEC would get more power, assistance[,] and money at its
disposal to be an effective securities markets regulator."1 8 3 Consistent with
its overall statutory approach, Congress did not rely on private plaintiffs to
pursue securities law violations; instead, enforcement flows through the
SEC. The statute as written encourages individuals to report to the SEC
because, otherwise, they would not enjoy the protection of the statute's anti-
retaliation provisions.
In concluding that an employee need not approach the SEC to enjoy
statutory "whistleblower" protections, however, the SEC, the Second
Circuit, and various district courts may have been recognizing reality. There
are good policy reasons to protect those who report potential violations only
internally, and without notifying the SEC. If employees are guaranteed
protection only if they report to the SEC, then that is what they will do.
Employees likely will either bypass their companies and internal
compliance entirely or go to the SEC no matter the company's response.
Sidelining the companies, however, hurts all parties: the SEC, the
employers, and the employees. Less corporate self-policing damages the
SEC's efforts to combat securities violations because companies play a
critical role in identifying, investigating, and remediating misconduct. It
would also require the SEC to devote its limited resources to pursuing tips
that companies could have addressed internally, at less public cost.
Meanwhile, if employers are bypassed entirely, they have no opportunity to
assess and redress before confronting an expensive, time-consuming, and
publicized SEC investigation and enforcement action. Instead of policing
itself, the company starts out defending itself, assuming a protective and
litigation stance from the beginning. Finally, protecting only those who go
to the SEC hurts those employees who prefer to address matters internally
and be seen as someone who wants to help the company. Even an employee
who would prefer not to be viewed as an adversary may feel compelled to
go to the SEC to guarantee full legal protection against retaliation.
It is no coincidence that, even as the SEC's rules do not require
employees to report internally to enjoy protection against retaliation, its'
183. S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 37 (2010).
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whistleblower program encourages employees to disclose first to their
employers. The SEC's Associate Director of Enforcement, who "helped
write the agency's rules," told the Society of Corporate Compliance and
Ethics-an association of corporate compliance professionals-"that the
purpose of the program is to bolster, not supplant, the compliance
framework in the private sector."1 8 4 Similarly, speaking at Stanford's
Directors College, SEC Chairman Mary Jo White affirmed it was a "good
thing" that, in practice, "in-house whistleblowers often have first reported
the issue internally at their company."18
Over time, more policymakers may come to support expanding the role
for private litigants and companies that self-police, instead of vesting
enforcement responsibility almost exclusively in regulatory bodies. If so,
however, they should recognize that such an approach would reflect a
significant departure from Dodd-Frank's statutory framework.
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